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BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax
Treaties
by Michael Lang
The OECD’s action plan on base erosion and profitshifting provides for the following measures as
action 6, under the heading ‘‘Prevent treaty abuse’’:
Develop model treaty provisions and recommen-
dations regarding the design of domestic rules to
prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappro-
priate circumstances. Work will also be done to
clarify that tax treaties are not intended to be
used to generate double non-taxation and to iden-
tify the tax policy considerations that, in general,
countries should consider before deciding to enter
into a tax treaty with another country. The work
will be co-ordinated with the work on hybrids.
The OECD has proposed a series of rules to be in-
troduced into income tax treaties in a public discussion
draft titled ‘‘BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting
of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances’’1
(hereinafter ‘‘Action 6 discussion draft’’). This is, how-
ever, merely a consultation draft, and the — over-
whelmingly critical — statements already submitted to
and published by the OECD may still prompt it to
amend or even withdraw the proposals.2 Nevertheless,
the formulations chosen in this public discussion draft
indicate that the OECD will be focusing its efforts on
commenting on the rules under discussion in more de-
tail instead of reviewing the rules on their merits. The
OECD is explicitly asking for proposals on how to de-
sign the OECD commentary on these rules.3
The public discussion draft contains the draft for
Article X, ‘‘Entitlement to Benefits,’’ the first five para-
graphs of which are described therein as ‘‘specific anti-
abuse rule aimed at treaty shopping’’ and again, ac-
cording to the OECD, are based on rules already
contained in several income tax treaties.4 The U.S. trea-
ties are mentioned first, followed by those of Japan
and India.5 These first five paragraphs of Article X are
meant to establish a limitation on benefits provision.
Action 6 discussion draft also contains a proposal
for Article X(6),6 ‘‘Rules aimed at arrangements one of
the main purposes of which is to obtain treaty ben-
efits’’:
1OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 5.
2See the numerous and partly detailed statements in OECD,
‘‘Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft ‘BEPS Action
6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances’’’ (2014).
3OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 10.
4OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 5.
5See id.
6See OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 10.
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Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Con-
vention, a benefit under this Convention shall not
be granted in respect of an item of income if it is
reasonable to conclude, having regard to all rel-
evant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that
benefit was one of the main purposes of any ar-
rangement or transaction that resulted directly or
indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established
that granting that benefit in these circumstances
would be in accordance with the object and pur-
pose of the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion.
The OECD proposal definitely reflects the current
trend — many countries have recently introduced gen-
eral antiavoidance rules or have seriously considered
their introduction. The European Commission has ex-
plicitly recommended the creation of those clauses to
its member states, yet it proposed a wording that has
so far been met with little positive response.7 Draft di-
rectives, such as those on the introduction of a com-
mon consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)8 or a
financial transaction tax,9 and proposals for the amend-
ment of existing directives (such as that on the parent-
subsidiary directive10) also contain formulations for
those clauses. These proposals, however, vary not just
in detail. Little international consensus exists on how
these rules must be designed and whether they are use-
ful at all.
Changes to existing income tax treaties always carry
the risk of the reverse conclusion.11 If, therefore, a rule
like the proposed Article X(6) is introduced in new
income tax treaties and in existing treaties with future
effect and is not simultaneously included in all treaties,
the question will inevitably arise as to what relevance
the principles enshrined in this rule have beyond their
scope of application. The absence of such a rule in
several treaties will lead some interpreters to believe
that precisely these principles are not binding therein.
Although such an argumentum a contrario is methodi-
cally very problematic, particularly regarding treaties,12
experience has shown that some courts will unavoid-
ably draw exactly that conclusion. This will not change
even if the OECD commentaries repeatedly and em-
phatically point out that those rules are only for clarifi-
cation purposes. In the past, rules that brought about
changes in substance have all too often been falsely
declared as clarifications so as to provide tax adminis-
trations with better arguments in favor of their applica-
tion with retroactive effect.13 Meanwhile, explicit refer-
ences to the clarifying character of some rules are even
further fueling the suspicion that their actual intention
is to bring about substantive change. It is difficult to
understand why a rule should prescribe something that
is not even necessary. For all these reasons, the OECD
should be cautious in proposing new rules because of
the obvious risk that the substance of various treaties
will begin drifting apart. New rules only make sense if
their benefits clearly outweigh the misgivings about
them. We will now examine in more detail whether
there are more reasons in favor of the introduction of
an Article X(6) into the OECD model treaty.
Scope of Application
The scope of application of a rule corresponding to
Article X(6) to be introduced into a treaty is limited to
the respective treaty. The rule refers to the ‘‘benefit un-
der this Convention.’’ Although that rule cannot lead
to the conclusion that something else definitely applies
beyond its scope of application, tax benefits granted on
the basis of domestic tax law could not be denied by
invoking that rule. It is equally inconceivable that that
rule could resonate with other treaties and provide a
legal basis for denying benefits under other treaties con-
cluded by one of the contracting states or even by
completely different states. A rule in a bilateral treaty
corresponding to Article X(6) cannot even cover other
international law treaties concluded between the same
contracting states — even if they have the same or
similar personal or substantive scope of application.
Interestingly, the scope of application of the pro-
posed rule in Article X(6) does not even extend to the
entire treaty. According to that rule, the benefit will not
be granted ‘‘in respect of an item of income.’’ There-
fore, it does not cover, for instance, the taxes on capital
covered by the substantive scope of application of the
OECD model.
A ‘‘benefit under this Convention’’ must refer to a
benefit resulting from the treaty. Definitions such as
those provisions based on article 3 of the OECD
model alone will not suffice, since no legal conse-
quences result. This also applies to the definition of
residence in article 4 of the OECD model. Even the
7See Michael Lang, ‘‘Direkte Steuern und EU-Steuerpolitik —
Wo bleiben die Visionen?’’ IStR 2013, 365 (367f).
8Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011) 121/4, at 48.
9Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax COM(2013)
71, at 30.
10Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/
96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable in the case
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States,
COM(2013) 0814, at 10.
11Regarding the problem of the reverse conclusion after
amendment of article 3(2) of the OECD model, see Lang, ‘‘Ten-
denzen in der Rechtsprechung des österreichischen Verwaltungs-
gerichtshofs zu den Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen,’’ IFF 2012,
26 (32).
12See Lang, IFF 2012, 26 (32 et seq.).
13See Lang, ‘‘Her Majesty the Queen v. Peter Sommerer: Abkom-
mensrechtliche Fragen der Zurechnung von Einkünften,’’ in:
Fitz, Kalss, Kautz, Kucsko, Lukas, and Torggler (publisher), Fest-
schrift für Hellwig Torggler (2013) 713 (722f).
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rules on the personal and substantive scope of applica-
tion of the income tax treaty in those provisions based
on articles 1 and 2 of the OECD model do not in
themselves convey a benefit. In the end, such a benefit
must result either from the distribution rules (articles 6
to 8, and 10 to 21) and usually in the source state, or
from the methods article in the state of residence. It
appears odd when the protection from discrimination
derived from article 24 of the OECD model is seen as
a benefit that can be obtained abusively. This is obvi-
ously how the authors of the draft see it.14 On the
other hand, the proposed rule of Article X(6) can
hardly affect article 28 of the OECD model, which
refers to the fiscal privileges of members of diplomatic
missions or consular posts. This rule merely makes it
clear that the treaties based on the OECD model are
not applicable. The privileges result from ‘‘the general
rules of international law or under the provisions of
special agreements’’ and not from a treaty.15
It is questionable whether the authorization to initi-
ate a mutual agreement procedure and subsequently an
arbitration procedure according to article 25 of the
OECD model could also be denied by invoking the
proposed rule of Article X(6). These procedural rules,
however, will not in themselves contain a ‘‘benefit un-
der this Convention,’’ since this procedure primarily
serves to help the administrative authorities of the two
states to exchange views on whether there is a risk of a
taxpayer obtaining a benefit he is not entitled to.
The question whether the application of the rules on
information exchange and mutual enforcement assis-
tance can also qualify as a ‘‘benefit under this Conven-
tion’’ may prima facie appear ironic. In most cases, the
implementation of mutual assistance does not bring a
benefit to the affected taxpayers; it is often detrimental
to them. On the other hand, it also gives administrative
authorities the opportunity to obtain a better picture of
the facts and can thus help taxpayers enforce their
claims under the treaty. In this case, however, when
considered in isolation no benefit results from the
treaty anyway, but these procedural provisions serve
the enforcement of other treaty provisions. When it
comes to information that allows the application of
domestic law, one can for this reason alone not speak
of a ‘‘benefit under this Convention.’’ This also applies
to the assistance in the collection of taxes referred to in
article 27 of the OECD model. Occasionally, however,
domestic rules (especially in EU member states) attach
benefits to the condition that comprehensive mutual
administrative and enforcement assistance applies to a
specific state. In this case, however, a benefit resulting
from domestic law is under consideration and not a
treaty benefit, so that for this reason the proposed rule
of Article X(6) cannot be effective.
The ‘‘benefit under this Convention,’’ stipulated as a
requirement for the application of Article X(6), also
raises other interpretation issues. Obviously, what is
meant is that the tax situation would have to improve
for the taxpayer as a result of the application of one or
several treaty provisions as compared with the domes-
tic legislation so that one can speak of a benefit. But
does this refer to taxation in one of the contracting
states, or is an overall consideration of the tax burdens
in both contracting states required? If the arrangement
chosen by the taxpayer is geared toward the application
of a withholding tax reduction under the treaty, this
would reduce the tax burden for the taxpayer in the
source state but not necessarily the overall tax burden.
This is because the lower withholding tax burden only
has an impact on the distribution of the taxation rights
between the two states if merely the state of residence
benefits, which is obliged to credit a lower foreign
withholding tax, thus reducing its forgone tax revenue.
It is difficult to assume a ‘‘benefit’’ for the taxpayer in
that situation. Although the higher tax remaining in
the state of residence can increase the possibility of
crediting other foreign taxes there, this benefit can be
then at most attributed to the same treaty if the foreign
tax originates from the same contracting state. When it
comes to crediting taxes of other states, one cannot
talk of a ‘‘benefit under this Convention.’’ But even if
the obligation to credit taxes also results from unilat-
eral rules in the absence of a treaty application, it is
highly questionable whether there is a benefit at all as
a result of the treaty.
The benefit cannot only result from the taxpayer
attempting to be covered by a withholding tax reduc-
tion under the treaty, but by a more favorable one than
he would otherwise be entitled to. He could therefore
aim at being treated subject to the often more favorable
rule of article 11 of the OECD model on interest than
that of article 10 of the OECD model, or even subject
to the dividend rule for parent-subsidiary situations
than the portfolio investment dividend rule within ar-
ticle 10(2) of the OECD model. According to the pub-
lic discussion draft, a ‘‘benefit under this Convention’’
can also exist when the benefit does not only result in
comparison to the application of domestic law but also
in comparison to another otherwise undisputedly appli-
cable treaty provision.
It is more difficult to answer the question whether
the proposed rule of Article X(6) will come into effect,
even if the taxpayer wants to use creative measures to
have its income fall under a different distribution rule
with the intention of reducing his withholding tax be-
cause a higher — calculated from the gross amount —
withholding tax would exceed the maximum tax credit
in the state of residence and double taxation would
therefore not be eliminated. In that case, the taxpayer
is attempting to bring about the effect intended by the
treaty (that is, avoiding double taxation). It would be
14See remarks in OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 11.
15See Daniel S. Smit, ‘‘General Report,’’ in: Lang, Pistone,
Schuch, Staringer, and Storck (eds.), Tax Rules in Non-Tax Agree-
ments (2012), 1(7).
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odd if the tax administration of the source state denied
this to him by invoking the antiabuse rule. The envis-
aged benefit would then probably be ‘‘in accordance
with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions
of this Convention.’’
The overall tax situation, however, is not always the
defining factor. Within the scope of application of the
exemption method, a benefit may in itself result simply
when the taxpayer is aiming to benefit from the legal
consequences of a distribution rule more favorable to
him in the source state. Similarly, the efforts of the tax-
payer to fall under the exemption method instead of
the credit method and thus completely rule out taxa-
tion in this country may be covered by Article X(6) in
the state of residence.
Obviously, the introductory phrase ‘‘Notwithstanding
the other provisions of this Convention’’ is meant to ex-
press that more specific antiabuse rules should not ex-
clude the application of Article X(6). This is by no
means self-evident, if one considers the opposite case law
of the German Federal Tax Court on the relationship
between the general antiabuse rule of section 42 of the
Tax Code (Abgabenordnung) and the more specific
antiabuse rules in German tax law.16 It is questionable
whether it makes sense to precisely describe situations
susceptible to creative setups in the treaty, only to extend
the legal consequences provided therein to other situa-
tions beyond the scope of application of these specific
rules through the general antiabuse rule. When, for in-
stance, the immovable property clause of article 13(4) of
the OECD model covers the alienation of shares ‘‘deriv-
ing more than 50 per cent of their value directly or indi-
rectly from immovable property,’’ it is hard to understand
why the general antiabuse rule should in some cases re-
duce the percentage to 50 percent or less.
The same applies to the application requirements of
an LOB rule defined in detail in the draft of Article
X(1)-(5). The specific antiabuse rules are thus running
the risk of becoming irrelevant. By the same token,
however, the opposite opinion may prevail in case law.
The ‘‘in accordance with the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions’’ requirement (discussed below)
could in those cases deprive the general antiabuse rule
of its scope of application. After all, the object and
purpose of specific antiabuse rules is to clearly define
the dividing line between those arrangements that con-
vey the envisaged benefit and those that no longer do.
In any event, the coexistence of general and specific
antiabuse rules leads to additional ambiguities. The
attempt to vest tax administrations with both general
and specific antiabuse rules, thus providing them with
particularly potent weapons, may have the reverse ef-
fect: In many years’ time, courts will perhaps establish
that these antiabuse rules are largely irrelevant.
‘Main Purpose’
The essential application requirement for the pro-
posed rule is the subjective criterion — obtaining a
benefit must be one of the ‘‘main purposes’’ in order
to trigger the legal consequences of Article X(6). The
difficulty of that criterion is obvious because it is im-
possible to prove an intention. Although the Action 6
discussion draft euphemistically speaks of the need to
carry out an ‘‘objective analysis of the aims and objects
of all persons involved,’’17 the declared objective is to
draw conclusions on the intention of the acting indi-
viduals on the basis of that ‘‘objective analysis.’’ Sub-
jective criteria can always be deduced on the basis of
external facts, yet the truth remains that those motives
are impossible to prove. Therefore, legislators abstain,
when possible, from attaching fiscal consequences to
the existence of such an intention. One of the rare and
no less problematic exceptions in treaty law is article
19(1)(b)(ii) of the OECD model, according to which
the state of residence has the taxation right for income
from government when the services are rendered in
that state of residence and the individual ‘‘did not be-
come a resident of that State solely for the purpose of
rendering the services.’’
In those cases, the rules on the burden of proof
usually determine the result. If, as part of its official
duty of investigation, the tax authority must furnish
proof that one of the main objectives of the taxpayer
was to obtain the benefit, it is already fighting a losing
battle. Alternatively, the taxpayer has no chance of
fending off the accusation of abuse if it is up to him to
furnish evidence that benefiting from one or several
treaty provisions was not one of his primary motives.
Against this background, Article X(6) does not leave
this procedural question up to the domestic law of the
contracting state but regulates it itself. If it is ‘‘reason-
able to conclude’’ that one of the main objectives of
the taxpayer was to obtain the benefits of the tax
treaty, Article X(6) comes into effect. On the one hand,
this rule puts the ball in the tax authority’s court,
which must draw this conclusion and justify it as well.
On the other hand, the requirements are not too de-
manding — it must be merely ‘‘reasonable’’ but not,
for instance, compelling. Therefore, the tax authority
does not need to produce full evidence thereof.18 The
rule thus attempts to establish a balance between the
interests of the authority and those of the taxpayer.
The bias in favor of the tax authority, however, is fairly
obvious, a fact that was also critically commented in
several statements submitted to the OECD.19 In prac-
tice, furnishing evidence of the motives will therefore
not be relevant, but tax authorities will be tempted to
presume intention simply because of the presence of a
16See Federal Fiscal Court, Dec. 15, 1999, I R 29/97; Jan. 19,
2000, I R 94/97; Mar. 20, 2002, I R 63/99; May 31, 2005, I R
74/04.
17OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 12.
18Similarly, id.
19See supra note 2.
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benefit. For this reason alone, the subjective criterion
runs the risk of not gaining any significance in itself.
The explanations provided in the public discussion
draft clearly indicate that the required subjective crite-
rion must not necessarily lie with the taxpayer who
would actually claim the benefit. This is implied by the
words ‘‘directly or indirectly.’’20 If, therefore, a group
company transfers an income source to a company of
the group resident in another state, and this other com-
pany can benefit from a more favorable treaty, it
should be possible to apply Article X(6), although the
driving force behind the arrangement is the transferring
company, which from the group’s overall perspective is
probably targeting a tax benefit. This benefit, however,
has an effect on the receiving company. Yet it could be
disputed even in this case, because without an income
source, this company would probably not have a tax
burden to bear. Therefore, it would not require the ap-
plication of the treaty at all. If one considers this case
to be covered under Article X(6), then (even if this is
not expressly dealt with in the public discussion draft)
that rule would also apply within a family if the
mother bestows her daughter resident in another state
with income-generating assets, thus achieving a more
favorable tax treatment of this income due to treaties.
The fact that the transfer is legally effective under civil
law and thus triggers consequences under corporate
and inheritance law, as well as other consequences,
seems to be immaterial. As a result, the scope of appli-
cation of the rule can be stretched to such an extent
that the actual or alleged intention of an individual (in
this case, the mother) can trigger the denial of fiscal
benefits to another individual (in this case, the daugh-
ter). Denying a taxpayer benefits that he would other-
wise be entitled to because of the allegedly detrimental
motive of another taxpayer is problematic.
An examination of legal developments in the Euro-
pean Union will reveal that there are different manifes-
tations of the subjective criterion. In its judgment in
the Halifax case, the European Court of Justice de-
manded that the ‘‘essential aim’’ of the transactions
concerned must be to obtain a tax advantage for an
abusive practice to be found to exist.21 This definition
was seized upon by the European Commission when it
proposed the introduction of a general antiabuse rule
in its recommendation for the fight against aggressive
tax planning.22 Subsequently, it used the same defini-
tion in its proposals for the adoption of a directive on
the financial transaction tax, and for the amendment to
the parent-subsidiary directive.23 The ECJ, however, did
not remain consistent in its terminology and spoke of a
‘‘principal aim’’ in its judgment in the Part Service
case.24 Even the European Commission changed its
terminology; in article 80 of its proposal for a directive
on the CCCTB, the commission demanded that trans-
actions must be ‘‘carried out for the sole purpose of
avoiding taxation.’’25 The European Parliament voted
in favor of withdrawing these requirements and replac-
ing ‘‘the sole purpose’’ with ‘‘the main purpose.’’26
The OECD proposals make it easier for tax admin-
istrations to assume an abuse. It is by no means re-
quired that the ‘‘sole purpose’’ of the arrangement
must consist in obtaining a tax benefit. It does not even
have to be an ‘‘essential,’’ ‘‘principal,’’ or even the
‘‘main purpose.’’ Instead, it suffices if one of the main
purposes of a transaction is to obtain a benefit. There-
fore, the rule assumes that not merely one main pur-
pose but two or even several main purposes can exist.
So even if the taxpayer succeeds in providing proof
that the arrangement he chose is also motivated by rea-
sons other than fiscal ones, the tax authority can retort
that, for the antiabuse rule to apply, it suffices if he also
targeted the tax benefit. Even if the taxpayer can suc-
cessfully present his nonfiscal motive as the main pur-
pose, it may still not be enough since according to the
rule, several main purposes can exist for an arrange-
ment. The accusation of abuse applies even if the tax-
payer, apart from one or even several nonfiscal main
purposes, also targeted the main purpose of obtaining
a treaty benefit. It remains unclear what criteria must
apply in distinguishing between main purposes and
secondary purposes on the one hand, and between dif-
ferent main purposes on the other. This distinction,
however, is paramount for the application of Article
X(6) and thus for the foreseen legal consequences.
The criteria discussed in the EU not only are more
balanced and comparatively easier to handle, but also
have an additional advantage that should not be underes-
timated. Their interpretation, should they be imple-
mented, is determined in a binding manner by the ECJ, a
court that is vested with the monopoly on the interpreta-
tion of EU legislation and is decoupled from the fiscal
interests of the individual member states. In the long
run, this at least guarantees a common understanding of
the subjective criterion. Treaty practice, on the other
hand, can drift apart. National courts may reach com-
pletely different judgments, and they are often unable to
free themselves from the fiscal interests of their state. In
dubio pro patria (when in doubt, for his country) seems to
be a principle that often determines the case law on trea-
ties. Even awards of bilateral arbitration boards do not
20See OECD, Action 6 discussion draft, at 6.
21Halifax (C-255/02), Feb. 21, 2006, I-1609, para. 75.
22Critical comments on this by Lang, ‘‘‘Aggressive Steuerpla-
nung’ — eine Analyse der Empfehlung der Europäischen Kom-
mission,’’ SWI 2013, 62 (62ff).
23See supra notes 9 and 10.
24Part Service (C-425/06), Feb. 21, 2008, I-897, para. 45.
25See supra note 8.
26European Parliament legislative resolution of Apr. 19, 2012,
on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) COM(2011) 0121, C7-
0092/2011, 2011/0058(CNS).
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have a binding effect going beyond the specific case. It is
not even guaranteed that they will be taken into account
in the interpretation of identical rules in another treaty.
The result can be double taxation. The vaguer a rule is,
the greater the risk that national courts will reach differ-
ent results in their interpretation.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether a rule like
Article X(6), when understood as a separate element
with an independent normative significance, can sur-
vive in constitutional legal systems characterized by the
rule of law.27 It does not come as a surprise that the
configuration of the subjective criterion was severely
criticized in many of the statements submitted to the
OECD.28 It is hard to ignore the conflict with the legal-
ity principle, which usually requires that rules are clear
and their application is predictable and not left to the
discretion of the tax authorities and the courts. Simi-
larly, in many states constitutional provisions require
the equal treatment of comparable cases. It remains to
be seen whether the unequal treatment of identical ar-
rangements, which differ from each other only in that
the taxpayer has in some cases managed to present the
envisaged benefit only as a secondary purpose, will
suffice to meet these requirements, and it will have to
be separately debated in each state and will probably
have to be answered in a different manner against the
backdrop of different constitutional frameworks.
The OECD draft is attempting to defuse the criti-
cism by repeatedly pointing out in its explanations how
meticulously the tax administrations will have to con-
sider the facts and circumstances in the application of
these rules. These explanations also attempt to relax
these criteria and literally relativize their significance.
This is also reflected by the fact that the OECD invites
interested parties to submit further proposals for the
commentary on this rule. Some of the authors of these
statements emphasize the need for clarifying explana-
tions and examples in the OECD commentary.29 They
obviously nourish hope that the rule can be mitigated
by the OECD commentary. Yet these experts seem to
overlook that, at the end of the day, the tax administra-
tions and the courts will be applying the rule, not the
OECD commentary. Regardless of whether one at-
taches only secondary relevance to the OECD com-
mentary in the interpretation of treaty rules according
to article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), or even sees it covered under article
31(2) or (4) of the VCLT,30 its importance will never
match that of a treaty provision. An opinion in the
OECD commentary that relativizes, and thus contra-
dicts, the rule itself is most likely to be ignored alto-
gether, and rightly so. Those who regard the subjective
criterion stipulated in Article X(6) as unsuitable must
oppose the rule itself.
‘Object and Purpose’
Article X(6) also stipulates another requirement, for-
mulated as an exception: If the subjective requirement
applies, the envisaged benefit will not be granted ‘‘un-
less it is established that granting that benefit in these
circumstances would be in accordance with the object
and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Conven-
tion.’’ Different procedural standards become obvious
here. While for the subjective criterion it suffices if it is
‘‘reasonable to conclude,’’ an exception can only apply
if the requirements for it are ‘‘established.’’ Here, the
bias in favor of the tax authorities is downright pal-
pable. Many of the statements submitted to the OECD
even expressed the concern that the burden of proof
would rest exclusively with the taxpayer.31
The fact that this criterion was formulated as an ex-
ception is irrelevant. Although literature and unfortu-
nately sometimes even the ECJ case law states that
exception rules are to be narrowly interpreted,32 today
this position is evidently obsolete and methodically un-
tenable.33 Article X(6) underscores that the question of
whether a requirement is formulated as an exception
depends on legal drafting and thus on coincidences in
the legislative procedure. There are no reasons to as-
cribe a different tenor to the rule if it were formulated
so that its application would also require, in addition
to the taxpayer’s motive, that the granting of a benefit
must oppose the object and purpose of the relevant
treaty provisions. Besides, Article X(6) is designed as
an exception to the otherwise granted treaty benefits;
therefore, the reference to the object and purpose of
the rule would be an exception from the exception and,
as a result, not an exception at all but a confirmation
of the basic rule. Those who take the view that excep-
tion rules should be ‘‘narrowly’’ interpreted would have
to interpret this requirement even more widely. All of
this demonstrates how ill-founded the theory of the
narrow interpretation of exception rules is.
I find the fear expressed in some statements that the
emphasis on an interpretation ‘‘in accordance with the
27On the debate in Austria, see Christoph Ritz, BAO-
Kommentar 5 (2014), section 22 Rz 5.
28See supra note 2.
29Id.
30See Lang and Florian Brugger, ‘‘The Role of the OECD
Commentary in Tax Treaty Interpretation’’ (2008), 23 Austl. Tax
F. 95 (95ff).
31See supra note 2.
32See Oude Luttikhuis (C-399/93), Dec. 12, 1995, I-4515,
para. 23; Commission v. France (C-384/01), May 8, 2003, I-4395,
para. 28; Commission v. France (C-94/09), May 6, 2010, I-4261,
para. 29; Commission v. France (C-492/08), June 17, 2010, I-5471,
para. 35.
33See Hans Georg Ruppe, Die Ausnahmebestimmung des Einkom-
mensteuergesetzes (1971), at 28; Gerold Stoll, Das Steuerschuldver-
hältnis in seiner grundlegenden Bedeutung für die steuerliche Rechtsfind-
ung (1972), at 104; Lang, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und
innerstaatliches Recht (1992), at 75f.
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object and purpose of the relevant provisions’’ in Ar-
ticle X(6) would give tax administrations the opportu-
nity to apply the law as they please to be unjustified.
For an experienced lawyer, it is evident that the object
and purpose of legal provisions must always be taken
into account in their interpretation. Any interpretation
that contents itself with the mere wording of a rule
would indeed not correspond to the state of the art of
legal method. Even those holding the view that the
wording of a rule is not just the beginning of the inter-
pretation but also defines its limits will have to realize
that the wording alone is most rarely so unambiguous
so as to allow for the interpretation of a rule while
ignoring its object and purpose. Therefore, the interpre-
tation of all rules, both favorable and unfavorable, must
always consider their object and purpose, not only
when it is assumed that one of the main motives of
the taxpayer was to obtain any benefit. For interna-
tional law treaties, article 31 of the VCLT confirms the
universal significance of focusing on the object and
purpose of a rule in its interpretation.
Especially against this background, however, the
question arises regarding why a separate rule is re-
quired that expressly underscores the relevance of the
objective in the interpretation of treaty provisions while
it also seems to attach this to the requirement that the
taxpayer is attempting to obtain a benefit from the cho-
sen arrangement. A conceivable interpretation would
be to draw the reverse conclusion from it and assume
for other cases — not explicitly covered by Article X(6)
— that the object and purpose of the rules must be
ignored in their interpretation, and that the interpreter
must restrict himself to the mere wording, considering
historic developments and context at most. Article X(6)
would then have to be understood as a positivist inter-
pretation rule, sending us back to the stone age of legal
method, and as a deviation from the interpretation rule
of article 31 of the VCLT, in which object and purpose
of the rules are particularly emphasized for the inter-
pretation of international treaties. For several reasons,
however, that understanding of Article X(6) is anything
but evident.
First, the explanations in the public discussion draft
do not contain any clues indicating that the main
meaning of this rule is to be found beyond its actual scope
of application and that the interpretation of treaty law as
a whole should change dramatically. Second, ignoring
the object and purpose in its interpretation is hardly
possible, since the individual aspects of the interpreta-
tion process, which aims at establishing the meaning as
a whole, are inextricably linked with each other and
cannot be split and divided at will. Third, one can
barely assume that the intention of Article X(6) is to
provide the benefit to the taxpayer when the authorities
are unable to ‘‘reasonably conclude’’ that one of the
main purposes of a transaction was for a benefit under
a tax treaty to be obtained, even if this is not consis-
tent with the object and purpose of the rule that gov-
erns the benefit.
Therefore, a different interpretation of this rule is
more evident, which can a priori eliminate otherwise
tangible concerns against it. Article X(6) stresses that a
benefit under the model can only be granted if it is in
accordance with the object and purpose of the model.
Even if Article X(6) particularly emphasizes the case in
which one of the main purposes of the taxpayer is
geared toward obtaining this benefit, this rule does not
exclude that in all other cases, too, benefits are only
granted if this is in accordance with the object and
purpose of these rules. Therefore, the interpretation of
a treaty always depends on the object and purpose of
the rule. Against this background, however, the motive
of the taxpayer, which was also mentioned as a re-
quirement in Article X(6), is rendered insignificant —
which motives are behind the taxpayer’s actions is irrel-
evant. Article X(6) does not have an independent legal
significance but merely underlines the already evident
need for interpretation to be based on the object and
purpose of the rules. Therefore, the rule is a mere hint
for the interpretation and totally expendable. It is never
possible to interpret rules while ignoring their object
and purpose.
Legal Consequences
Those who disagree with the above opinion and re-
gard Article X(6) as a separate exception that justifies
the denial of benefits under a treaty must also address
the legal consequences of this rule. The wording of the
rule is concise: The benefit ‘‘shall not be granted.’’ The
consequence that the envisaged benefit should not be
granted, however, does not yet suffice to get us out of
the woods. The question here is which treaty provision
should be applied instead: none or a different one, and,
if so, which one?
If, for instance, a shareholder capitalizes his com-
pany resident in the other contracting state with debt
instead of equity so that the consideration falls under
the treaty provision based on article 11 (and not article
10) of the OECD model and so as not to pay any
taxes instead of the 15 percent withholding tax pro-
vided for in article 10 of the OECD model — because
the specific treaty allocates the right to tax interest ex-
clusively to the state of residence — the application of
Article X(6) will result in the non-application of the
article on interest. Does this, however, mean that none
of the distribution rules of the treaty apply, and that
the source state collects the withholding tax provided
under its domestic law, so that the treaty is no longer
relevant? Or is the rule based on article 11 of the
OECD model to be ignored and the catch-all provision
of article 21 of the OECD model to be applied in-
stead? As a rule, however, this would not alter the re-
sult, since under this provision the source state does
not have a taxation right either. Or is the legal conse-
quence of the provision based on article 10 of the
OECD model relevant instead, and the taxation right
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should, for instance, be reduced to 15 percent? Accord-
ing to the meaning of the rule, the option last men-
tioned is the more obvious. Yet Article X(6) only refers
to the rule that should not be applied, without deter-
mining the application of the ‘‘suitable’’ rule. The re-
duction to 15 percent is only justifiable if one only
considers the envisaged reduction of the withholding
tax from 15 percent to 0 percent as the ‘‘benefit’’ to be
denied, but not the application of the article on inter-
est.
This also raises the question regarding what this
means for the state of residence. Article X(6) does not
explicitly address only one of the two contracting
states, so that the provision could be applied in both
states. It does, however, refer to the benefit that the
taxpayer, based on the chosen arrangement, only envis-
aged in the source state, at least in the underlying ex-
ample, and which only there was denied to him. If,
however, the consequence thereof is that the state of
residence continues to apply the interest article of the
treaty and, as a result, considers itself as being exclu-
sively entitled to tax the income (without crediting a
tax collected in the other contracting state) this will
lead to double taxation. It is questionable whether such
a result is conclusive. It may seem fair at first that
those who are intent upon exploiting the benefits under
a treaty should accept that they may not obtain the
envisaged benefit but also not become exposed to
double taxation. The wording of Article X(6), however,
contains no indication that those penalizing conse-
quences are to be drawn from this rule. Income tax
treaties do not contain criminal law provisions. Those
who, like the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in its
partnership report and subsequently in the commentary
on the OECD model, solve qualification conflicts be-
tween the source state and the state of residence by
stipulating that the residence state must avoid double
taxation34 should also plead this case here. When with-
holding tax is collected in the source state ‘‘under this
Convention,’’ this could prompt the state of residence
to credit this withholding tax or to exempt the income.
The only objection against this would be that this
qualification conflict is based not on diverging national
regulations but on the application of different treaty
provisions in the two states.35 The wording of article
23A and B does not, however, make a distinction ac-
cording to whether the other state regards itself as en-
titled to taxation ‘‘under this Convention’’ because of
this, since this qualification conflict originates in do-
mestic law.36
Those who consider the legal consequences provided
for dividends appropriate and therefore advocate a
withholding tax not exceeding 15 percent in the source
state by invoking Article X(6) could also be in favor of
the application of the same statutory provision in the
state of residence and demand the crediting of the
withholding tax there under the treaty provisions based
on articles 10 and 23 of the OECD model. This would
eliminate the otherwise imminent risk of double taxa-
tion. From the point of view of the state of residence,
however, this would raise the question as to why this
state must waive tax revenue because the taxpayer
aimed at a tax benefit not intended for him and there-
fore fell under the scope of Article X(6). One could
argue that if the arrangement had been appropriate
beforehand, the shareholder would have financed his
company with equity in the first place and would have
received dividends accordingly. In this case, the state of
residence would have to credit a withholding tax not
exceeding 15 percent in accordance with the treaty pro-
visions based on articles 10 and 23 of the OECD
model.
The problem is even more complicated in situations
involving three states. The following case could illus-
trate this: A taxpayer resident in state A holds shares
in a company resident in state C and transfers his
mostly debt-financed participation in the company to a
subsidiary resident in state B, due to the lower with-
holding tax rates admissible in the state B treaty. The
allegation is that this ‘‘main purpose’’ will cause the
rule otherwise provided for in the treaty between C
and B not to be applied, according to which the with-
holding tax must be reduced to 10 percent. If the
treaty between A and C provides for a maximum of 15
percent withholding tax for dividends, does this mean
that the denial of the envisaged benefit under the treaty
between B and C will result in state C having to apply
the article on dividends from the treaty between A and
C instead, or that at least the legal consequence stipu-
lated therein becomes relevant and the withholding tax
is limited to 15 percent?
The underlying and more far-reaching question is
whether Article X(6) ultimately feigns that the divi-
dends from the company resident in state C are paid
directly to the partner resident in state A, and which
consequences this will possibly have for the other states
and taxpayers involved. Must state A therefore credit
the withholding tax of state C admissibly collected ac-
cording to the treaty between A and C to the income34See OECD, ‘‘The Application of the OECD Model Tax
Convention to Partnerships,’’ in: OECD, Issues in International
Taxation No. 6 (1999), para. 25; critical comments by Lang, The
Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (2000),
37ff.
35See Helmut Loukota, ‘‘Der Einfluss des Ertragsteuerrechtes
auf die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen,’’ in:
Beiser, Kirchmayr, Mayr, and Zorn (publisher), Ertragsteuern in
Wissenschaft und Praxis (2007), 263 (280f).
36Critical comments by Lang, ‘‘Personengesellschaften und
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen,’’ in: Bertl, Eberhartinger, Egger,
Kalss, Lang, Nowotny, Riegler, Schuch, and Staringer (publisher)
Personengesellschaften im Unternehmens- und Steuerrecht (2013), 225
(239ff).
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tax collected on the level of the partner, although the
dividends originate from the company in state B and
thus not from state C at all? Under which treaty is
state A obliged to do so? Or does the obligation of
state B to credit the withholding tax paid in state C
according to the treaty between B and C also remain in
effect? And if this obligation remains in effect, must
the amount to be credited remain unlimited (that is,
must the tax be credited regardless of the amount col-
lected in state C according to its domestic law)? Or
must the tax be credited in accordance with the divi-
dend article of the treaty between B and C, which,
however, is not applicable to state C due to Article
X(6)? Or must state B credit the highest withholding
tax admissible in state C according to the treaty be-
tween A and C?
These questions are only touched upon here. But
even if they were addressed in greater detail, the an-
swers would not be more gratifying. The dilemma re-
mains the same if one understands Article X(6) as a
taxation rule with its own requirements and legal con-
sequences. If one regards this rule only as an order to
abolish specific treaty benefits in one state, this rule
leads to double taxation and has penalizing effects.
Whoever refuses to accept these consequences must
derive from Article X(6) a fiction that goes beyond the
arrangement considered appropriate. One would then
be facing similar difficulties to those often encountered
in the application of GAARs: Those who interpret a
legal provision as an entitlement to the fiction of facts
must answer the question of how far this fiction
reaches and when it will be replaced again by the real
facts.37 Reestablishing the actual facts of taxation will
lead to seemingly arbitrary and thus unsatisfactory con-
sequences.
Concluding Summary
The analysis carried out here shows that upon closer
examination, the proposed antiabuse rule turns out to
have no legal relevance. Yet the mere existence of this
rule will cause uncertainty, and individual tax adminis-
trations and courts will not be deterred from using it as
a basis for the denial of treaty benefits. If such a rule
is actually introduced into income tax treaties, its inter-
pretation and application will be dealt with intensively
both in practice and in theory. The criticism contained
in the statements submitted to the OECD is directed
against the design of the rule, unilaterally geared to-
ward the interests of tax administrations, but not
against such a rule altogether.38 The difficulties noted
herein, however, are not only attributable to the details
of the rule. Similar and equally justified criticism
would also be directed against any other tax rule that
makes combating tax avoidance subject to a combina-
tion of objective and subjective requirements.
At first glance, the OECD proposal to introduce
such a general antiabuse rule in the treaty is a conve-
nient solution for all sides. In this manner, the OECD
would have implemented part of its action plan and
introduced measures. That quick success can be sold in
the media as another tool in the fight against tax evad-
ers. Tax administrations would receive an additional
instrument to deny tax benefits that seem suspicious to
them. Understandably, companies reluctantly resist
such a rule, which is often directed primarily against its
proposed design.39 Many obviously presume that a
careful preparation will allow them to dispel the im-
pression that an envisaged tax benefit had priority in
the planning of a transaction. The resulting additional
effort required for tax planning considerations will, in
turn, benefit consultants the most. If they succeed in
dispelling the suspicion that obtaining a benefit was a
main purpose, companies and consultants can rely on
the mere wording of the treaty provisions for their tax
planning considerations and ignore the object and pur-
pose of the rules that could pose an obstacle to their
envisaged success.
It is precisely for this reason that such a rule is not
merely superfluous but also detrimental to legal cul-
ture.40 When it is not certain whether an arrangement
chosen by a taxpayer is covered by a treaty provision,
practitioners will not ask for the object and purpose of
the treaty provision but will apply a vague antiabuse
provision instead, and the facts will be assessed based
on the practitioner’s legal instinct and not from the law.
Alternatively, tax administrations and courts will be
tempted to restrict themselves to the alleged clear
wording and to ignore the object and purpose of the
legal provisions. The application of law, however, will
eventually be impoverished if it limits itself to the
‘‘primitive positivism of the naked word.’’41 The late
German Supreme Court judge Ludwig Schmidt
pointed out in section 42 of the German Composition
Code (Abgabenordnung) that a good lawyer does not
require an antiabuse rule,42 since he will apply the te-
leological interpretation. A weak lawyer, on the other
hand, will clutch at the straws that general antiabuse
rules seemingly offer and will hope to avoid the often
37For more on this problem, see Lang and Christian Mas-
soner, ‘‘Die Grenzen steuerlicher Gestaltung in der österreichis-
chen Rechtsprechung,’’ in: Lang, Schuch, and Staringer (pub-
lisher), Die Grenzen steuerlicher Gestaltung in der Österreichischen
Rechtsprechung (2009), 15 (32ff).
38See supra note 2.
39Id.
40Already commented on by Lang, SWI 2013, 67 (on the
European Commission’s recommendation for the introduction of
abuse rules in the EU member states).
41Walter Antoniolli, ‘‘Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz,’’ ÖJZ 1956,
646 (647).
42See Wolfgang Schön, ‘‘Ludwig Schmidt (1928-2011),’’ FR
2011, 1125 (1125 f).
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painstaking and demanding analysis of the object and
purpose of the rule by resorting to a rule that allows
him to replace the interpretation of the law with his
subjective sense of justice. In his closing arguments in
Cartesio, former Advocate General Luís Miguel Poiares
Maduro described in reference to Gutteridge the abuse
of rights principle as ‘‘a drug which at first appears to
be innocuous, but may be followed by very disagree-
able after effects.’’43 The OECD should keep its hands
off it!44
Hope can be found in the position of the United
States, which has previously managed to ensure that
the BEPS proposals do not run contrary to its interests.
The LOB rule found in Article X(1)-(5) of the draft,
which largely corresponds to the rule in U.S. treaties
and was intentionally not included in other treaties by
many countries, testifies to this. In this manner, the
OECD model is adjusted to the U.S. model. In con-
trast, rules similar to Article X(6) have so far been re-
jected by the United States. The U.S. Senate has even
made the approval of the ratification of already negoti-
ated treaties conditional on the deletion of a ‘‘main
purpose test’’ contained in the treaty.45 The reserva-
tions expressed at the time against such a rule were
clearly articulated by the Senate committee:
The new main purpose tests in the proposed
treaty are subjective, vague and add uncertainty
to the treaty. It is unclear how the provisions are
to be applied. In addition, the provisions lack
conformity with other U.S. tax treaties. This un-
certainty could create difficulties for legitimate
business transactions, and can hinder a taxpayer’s
ability to rely on the treaty.46
These arguments are as convincing now as they
were at the time. If, however, the OECD cannot be
deterred from introducing a general antiabuse rule
similar to Article X(6) into the model, it will not only
impair the quality of the OECD model but will also
contribute to its loss of significance because not all
states will be able to accept such a rule in their trea-
ties. ◆
43Opinion of AG Maduro of May 22, 2008, Cartesio oktató és
Szolgáltató bt (C-210/06), [2008], I-9641, para. 55 with reference
to H.C. Gutteridge, ‘‘Abuse of Rights,’’ 5 Cambridge L.J., 22, 44,
1933-1935.
44On the recommendation of the EU, see Lang, SWI 2013,
68.
45Kristen A. Parillo, ‘‘Italy-U.S. Tax Treaty Enters Into
Force,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, Jan. 4, 2010, p. 37.
46Senate Executive Report 106-8 (1999), 4.
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